SPECIFIC REQUESTS AND THE
PROSECUTORIAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE
EVIDENCE: THE IMPACT OF
UNITED STATES v. BAGLEY
Brady v. Maryland I established that, as a matter of due process, a
criminal defendant has an access right upon request to evidence within
the prosecutor's possession that is both favorable and material to the
defense.2 The extent of this constitutional right, however, depends on
the definition of materiality. In United States v. Agurs, 3 the Supreme
Court created a two-tiered framework for determining materiality. With
respect to evidence that the defense specifically requested, the test was
whether the evidence "might have affected the outcome of the trial."' 4
With respect to generally requested evidence or evidence not requested at
all, the standard was higher and less inclusive: evidence was material if it
"create[d] a reasonable doubt which did not otherwise exist."
In Agurs the Court imposed a lesser burden on the defendant in the
specific request context because a specific request facilitates prosecutorial
compliance by providing notice of evidence that the defense lacks and
perceives as important. 6 Implicit in the Court's reasoning was the notion
that suppression of evidence specifically requested by the defendant is
fundamentally unfair and amounts to prosecutorial misdealing. 7
In United States v. Bagley,8 however, a divided Supreme Court replaced the Brady-A gurs materiality framework with a single materiality
standard. 9 Under Bagley, evidence is material if there is a "reasonable
probability" that it "would" alter the trial result. 10 The Court characterized this standard as "sufficiently flexible" to cover both the specific request and general/no request contexts."I Although it theoretically
preserves a favored position for a defendant making a specific request,
1. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2. Id. at 87. A prosecutor's failure to disclose requested evidence that is both favorable and
material entitles the defendant to a retrial. See id. at 85-87.
3. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
4. Id. at 104.
5. Id at 112.
6. Id. at 106-07.
7. See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
8. 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985).
9. Id. at 3382-84.
10. Id. at 3384.
11. Id.
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the Bagley standard eliminates, as a practical matter, the advantage such
a defendant possessed under the Brady-Agurs materiality standard.
The Bagley majority ignored the concern with notice and fairness
that was thought in Agurs to justify a lower specific request materiality
standard. 12 Instead, Justice Blackmun 13 focused on the notion that the
defendant often suffers greater harm from nondisclosure after a specific
request than he does after a general request, because nondisclosure in the
former context is more likely to misleadingly represent to the defendant
that the requested evidence does not exist. 14 Seeking to address this concern, Justice Blackmun incorporated into the single materiality standard
a requirement that reviewing courts consider any additional "adverse
effects" the defendant suffers as a result of the prosecutor's failure to
disclose evidence following a specific request. 15 Justice Blackmun maintained that the defendant making a specific request would have an easier
time demonstrating materiality because reviewing courts would consider
these "specific" adverse effects.' 6 Only one lower court, however, has
followed Justice Blackmun's instructions to consider whether the defense
suffered any "specific" adverse effects.' 7 Three circuits, confused by the
divided nature of the Bagley decision, have concluded that the Bagley
Court intentionally adopted a standard that treats specific and general/
no requests the same.18 Two other circuits, while correctly concluding
that the Bagley Court intended to accord favorable treatment to specific
requests, have yet actually to apply the Bagley analysis by considering
whether the defense suffered any "specific" adverse effects. 19 This note
will demonstrate that "specific" adverse effects cannot exist because nondisclosure following a specific request is no more likely to misleadingly
represent to the defense that evidence does not exist than is nondisclosure
following a general request.20 Furthermore, this note will demonstrate
that consideration of the adverse effects of a nondisclosure's misleading
representation to the defense that evidence does not exist will never help
12. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
13. Announcing the Court's decision, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, wrote a
three-part opinion. Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, concurred
with parts I, II and portions of part III. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented.
Justice Stevens also wrote a dissenting opinion. Justice Powell did not participate in the Court's
decision.
14. See infra notes 105-06, 163-65 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 107-09, 148-50 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
20. See hifra pp. 911-13.
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the defense prove materiality.2 1
This note begins with a discussion of the pre-Bagley materiality

standard, tracing the origins of the prosecution's constitutional disclo-

22
sure duty and focusing on the Brady-Agurs materiality framework.

The note then examines the Bagley holding and the conflicting ways in
which the courts of appeals have interpreted that holding. 23 Finally, the
note analyzes the Bagley standard in three steps. First, the theoretical
operation of the new standard is examined and illustrated.2 4 Second, the
Court's undiscussed shift away from the Brady-Agurs rationale is explored.2 5 The note concludes that notwithstanding the theoretical operation of the new standard, in practice a defendant making a specific
request can claim no special adverse effects arising from nondisclosure.
I.

MATERIALITY BEFORE BAGLEY:

THE BRADY-AGURS

FRAMEWORK

The origins of the prosecution's constitutional duty to disclose material evidence favorable to the accused are found in a series of three
Supreme Court decisions: Mooney v. Holohan,2 6 Alcorta v. Texas, 27 and
Napue v. Illinois.2 8 Together, these three cases held that due process pro-

hibits a prosecutor from intentionally using or failing to correct false testimony, even when the testimony relates solely to a witness's
29
credibility.
Brady v. Maryland30 significantly expanded the constitutional duties of the prosecution by requiring that the prosecution disclose to the
defense material, favorable evidence upon request. 3' In Brady, the de21. See infra pp. 913-14.
22. See infra notes 26-70 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 71-147 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
26. 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam).
27. 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (per curiam).
28. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
29. In Mooney, the Court held that a prosecutor's intentional use of perjured testimony violates
a defendant's right to due process. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112. The Court reasoned that such
prosecutorial deception was "inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice." Id..
In Alcorta, the Court extended the Mooney rule by concluding that a prosecutor's knowing
failure to correct inculpatory, perjured testimony violates due process. Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 31-32.
The Court gave greater scope to the duty to correct false testimony in Napue. There the Court held
that a prosecutor's failure to correct false testimony violates due process even when the testimony
relates solely to a witness's credibility. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. The Court justified this broader rule
by reasoning that "Ithejury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well
be determinative of guilt or innocence." Id.
30. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
31. Id. at 87.
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fendant was sentenced to death for first-degree murder. 32 Despite the
defendant's pretrial specific request for all the extrajudicial statements of
a codefendant, the prosecution withheld the codefendant's statement in
33
which he admitted committing the homicide.
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution's nondisclosure of the
requested evidence denied Brady due process, reasoning that the jury
34
might not have invoked the death penalty had it heard this evidence.
The Court concluded that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. ' 35 In support of its holding,
the Court relied on the concern for due process elaborated in Mooney,
stating that "[t]he principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of
society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to
the accused."'36 Thus the Brady Court determined that fairness required
not merely that the prosecution refrain from misleading the jury through
a presentation of false facts, but also that the prosecution disclose mate37
rial, favorable evidence upon request of the defense.
Brady, however, left two important questions unanswered: the first
concerned the definition of "material, ' 38 and the second concerned
whether the standard enunciated applied only if a specific request for
39
evidence had been made.
The Court addressed both of these questions in United States v.
Agurs.40 In Agurs a jury convicted the defendant of second-degree murder.4 1 At trial, the defense attorney presented a theory of self-defense,
offering evidence of the defendant's screams for help and the victim's
32. Id. at 84.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 88, 90.
35. Id. at 87.
36. Id.
37. Brady was foreshadowed by United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955), and United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953).
38. Professor Babcock explains that "[l]eading precedents understood 'materiality' to correspond to a certain quantum of likelihood that the undisclosed evidence would have affected the
verdict." Babcock, FairPlay: Evidence Favorableto an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel,
34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1146 n.46 (1982).
39. Justice Fortas argued that no specific request should be required. See Giles v. Maryland,
386 U.S. 66, 102 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring). Defense lawyers assumed that Brady required no
specific request and immediately began making general requests for all Brady material. See Babcock, supra note 38, at 1143-45.
40. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
41. Id. at 98.
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prior possession of two knives. 42 After the conviction, the defense attorney moved for a new trial on the ground that the prosecution had failed
to disclose the victim's record of criminal violence, 43 evidence that the
defense attorney had not requested before the trial. 44 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit accepted the defendant's argument and held that the evidence was sufficiently material
because the jury might have returned a different verdict had the evidence
45
been received.
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court distinguished three contexts in which the Brady disclosure duty arguably could apply 46 and articulated a materiality standard for each. First, the Court described the
Mooney situation in which "the undisclosed evidence demonstrates that
the prosecution's case includes perjured testimony and the prosecution
knew, or should have known, of the perjury. '47 Such a situation is reversible error, the Court explained, "if there is any reasonable likelihood
that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury."' 48
The Court described the second context in which the Brady disclosure duty applied as the situation presented in Brady-prosecutorial nondisclosure of specifically requested evidence.4 9 Although Brady never
explicitly articulated the contours of its standard, the Agurs Court said
that a fair analysis ofBrady "indicates that implicit in the requirement of
materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected
' 50
the outcome of the trial."
The Court identified the third context as prosecutorial nondisclosure in response to a general request or no request at all.5 ' According to
the Court, this third situation applied to the Agurs facts5 2 and required a
higher, less inclusive materiality standard:5 3 undisclosed evidence is material in this context if it "creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist."' 54 For the Court, the difference between the Brady and the
Agurs contexts was the degree of notice to the prosecutor. With a specific request, the Court emphasized, the prosecutor understands exactly
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 100.
Id.
Id. at 101.
United States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-07.
Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 104.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 104, 106-07.
Id. at 106-07.
Id.
Id. at 112.
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what the defense desires.55 A general request, conversely, "really gives
the prosecutor no better notice than if no request is made." 56 The Court
thus reasoned that the constitutional disclosure duty should be less in the

case of a general or no request than in the specific request situation

57
presented in Brady.
In its effort to define the materiality standard for the general request, the Court reviewed standards previously used by lower courts.58
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
had used a standard that required disclosure of evidence that might affect
the jury's verdict.5 9 The Supreme Court rejected this standard as too

favorable to the defense. 60 On the other hand, the Court rejected as too
burdensome for the defense the standard applicable to evidence discov-

ered from a neutral source after trial. 61 That standard required a new
trial if the new evidence would probably produce an acquittal in a new

trial. 62 The Court emphasized that if the "new evidence" standard were
used to define materiality, "there would be no special significance to the
63
prosecutor's obligation to serve the cause of justice."

After considering these two materiality standards, the Court established the following standard for situations in which no request or only a

general request has been made: undisclosed evidence is material if it

"creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist."' 64 The Court

thus settled on a materiality standard that reflected its "overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt."' 65 Applying this new stan55. Id. at 106.
56. Id. at 106-07.
57. Id. at 107.
58. Id. at 107-12.
59. United States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
60. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108-09.
61. Id. at 111.
62. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 provides: "The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial
to him in the interest ofjustice." Most courts have interpreted this rule as requiring a new trial if the
new evidence would probably produce an acquittal in a new trial. See, e.g., United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); United States v. Mackin, 561
F.2d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977); United States v. Garner, 529 F.2d 962,
969 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922, 429 U.S. 850 (1976).
63. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111.
64. Id. at 112 (emphasis added). Despite some disagreement, most commentators agree that
the Agurs opinion stated this materiality standard clearly. See Note, A Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose
Promises of Favorable Treatment Made to Witnessesfor the Prosecution, 94 HARV. L. REV. 887, 893
(1981); Comment, The Prosecutor'sDuty of Disclosure: From Brady to Augers and Beyond, 69 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 197, 204 (1978) [hereinafter Comment, Prosecutor'sDuty]; Comment,
Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Reconsidered, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 480, 488 n.57 [hereinafter Comment, Prosecutor'sDuty Reconsidered]; cf Babcock, supra note 38, at 1175-77 (arguing that Agurs
"tells us what the standard for review is not").
65. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112.
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dard to the facts in Agurs, the Court held that the evidence did not create
66
a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.
Agurs, in conjunction with Brady, yielded a straightforward framework for determining the proper materiality standard to be applied to
given evidence. 67 First, the reviewing court was to decide whether the
case involved (1) the knowing use of perjury, (2) nondisclosure in response to a specific request, or (3) nondisclosure in response to a general
or no request. Once the court determined the applicable context, the
materiality standard would be immediately identifiable. For the first category, evidence would be material if there was "any reasonable likelihood
that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury." 68
For the second category, evidence would be material if it "might have
affected the outcome of the trial."' 69 For the third category, evidence
would be material if it created "a reasonable doubt which did not other'70
wise exist."
II. THE DEMISE OF THE BRADY-AGURS FRAMEWORK: UNITED
STATES V. BAGLEY

In United States v. Bagley,7 1 the Supreme Court replaced the BradyAgurs materiality framework with a single "flexible" standard. Announcing the judgment of the Court, Justice Blackmun, in the portion of
his opinion that was joined by a majority of the Court, determined that
Agurs had left unresolved the materiality standard applicable to specifically requested evidence and proceeded to define it.72 By contrast, Justice Stevens, who had written the opinion for the Court in Agurs, argued
in dissent that the Court had already resolved the specific request stan73
dard in Brady and Agurs.
Bagley was indicted on fifteen charges of violating federal narcotics
and firearm statutes.7 4 Before trial, Bagley's attorney filed a discovery
motion specifically requesting "any deals, promises or inducements made
66. Id. at 113-14.
67. One commentator argues that the determination of the proper materiality standard is just
the beginning of a court's analysis. The next, more complex step is the court's application of the
materiality standard to the given evidence. Several factors must be considered in this second step:
favorability, admissibility, the extent to which evidence is cumulative, and weight of the evidence.
See Comment, Prosecutor'sDuty, supra note 64, at 225.
68. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103.
69. Id. at 104.
70. Id. at 112.
71. 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985).
72. Id. at 3381. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
73. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3399 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
74. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3377.
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to witnesses in exchange for testimony. ' 75 The government responded
that no "deals, promises or inducements" had been made to either of its
two principal witnesses, O'Connor or Mitchell, each of whom had assisted the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) in an
undercover investigation of Bagley.76 At the nonjury trial, O'Connor
and Mitchell gave testimony relating to both the firearms and the narcotics charges. 77 The Court found Bagley guilty on the narcotics charges,

78
but acquitted him on the firearms charges.

After the trial, in response to his requests made pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act 79 and the Privacy Act of 1974,80 Bagley
received copies of ATF form contracts signed by Mitchell and O'Connor.
The contracts guaranteed payment "commensurate with services and information rendered."' 8 1 Bagley moved to have his sentence vacated, alleging that the government's failure to disclose this specifically requested
82
evidence constituted a violation of due process under Brady.
The motion came before the same district court judge who had presided at Bagley's trial.8 3 After an evidentiary hearing before a magistrate,8 4 the district court ruled that had the existence of the ATF
contract been disclosed to it during trial, its finding would not have been
affected.8 5
86
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
on the theory that the government's nondisclosure impaired Bagley's
right to confront hostile witnesses. 87 The court, relying on the Supreme
Court's decision in Davis v. Alaska,8 8 held that "the denial of the 'right of
effective cross-examination' was 'constitutional error of the first magni'89
tude' requiring automatic reversal."
The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the court of appeals, holding
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3378.

Id.
79. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).

80. Id. § 552a.
81. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3378.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 3379. Whereas the magistrate found that neither Mitchell nor O'Connor expected to
receive compensation for their testimony, the district court found that Mitchell and O'Connor probably expected to receive compensation. Id. at 3378.
86. Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub noma.United States v.
Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985).
87. Id.
88. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
89. Bagley, 719 F.2d at 1464 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318).

900
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that the Ninth Circuit had misapplied Davis.90 Justice Blackmun, in the
part of his opinion that was joined by a majority of the Court, distinguished Davis, pointing out that there the trial judge had entirely disallowed the cross-examination of a crucial prosecution witness. 91 In
contrast, the trial court in Bagley had not directly restricted the scope of
cross-examination; rather, "[t]he constitutional error, if any, in this case
was the Government's failure to assist the defense by disclosing information that might have been helpful in conducting the cross-examination."' 92 Justice Blackmun explained that such nondisclosure is
constitutional error only when the evidence is "material in the sense that
93
its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."
Justice Blackmun next considered the appropriate standard for assessing the materiality of the suppressed evidence. 94 He examined the
Brady-Agurs framework95 and concluded that the Agurs Court never de96
fined the materiality standard applicable in the specific request context.
In his view, Agurs went no further than to suggest that the specific request materiality standard should be more lenient than the general/no
request standard.9 7 According to Justice Blackmun, the Agurs Court's
description of materiality as evidence that "might have affected the outcome of the trial" should not be understood as indicating a materiality
98
standard.
To define the specific request materiality standard, Justice Blackmun looked to two earlier Supreme Court cases, Strickland v. Washington 99 and United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal.100 Both cases had
discussed Agurs but neither involved prosecutorial nondisclosure.' 0 ' Jus90. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3379, 3381.

91. Id. at 3381.
92. Id.

93. Id.
94. Id. at 3381-84 (opinion of Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J.) A majority of the Court
agreed with this portion of Justice Blackmun's opinion. Justice White, while joining only parts I and
II, agreed in his concurrence with Justice Blackmun's conclusion as to the appropriate materiality
standard. Id. at 3385 (White, J., concurring) ("I also agree with Justice Blackmun that.. . 'evidence
is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' "). Justice White's concurring opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
95. Id. at 3382-83 (opinion of Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J.).
96. Id.

97. Id.
98. Id. at 3383 n.12.
99. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
100. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
101. Strickland involved the standard of materiality necessary to prove that defense counsel's
ineffectiveness deprived the defendant of due process. Strickland 466 U.S. at 671. ValenzuelaBernal considered the standard of materiality necessary to demonstrate constitutional error when
favorable witnesses are deported as illegal aliens. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 860.
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tice Blackmun selected the materiality standard formulated in Strickland.102 The Strickland Court had held that a defense counsel's
unprofessional errors constitute a due process violation when "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for [the] errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 10 3 The Bagley majority thus adopted Strickland's "reasonable probability" standard for
use in the prosecutorial nondisclosure context.
The Bagley majority declared that the Strickland standard was "sufficiently flexible" to cover both the specific request and the general/no
request contexts. 104 Justice Blackmun believed that prosecutorial nondisclosure in response to a specific request often injures the defense more
than nondisclosure in response to a general/no request.10 5 According to
Justice Blackmun, nondisclosure in response to a specific request "not
only deprives the defense of certain evidence, but has the effect of representing to the defense that the evidence does not exist. In reliance on this
misleading representation, the defense might abandon lines of independent investigation, defense, or trial strategies that it otherwise would have
pursued. 10° 6 But Justice Blackmun claimed that despite the greater potential for injury to the defense in the specific request context, a separate,
more favorable specific request materiality standard was not necessary. 107 Instead, Justice Blackmun maintained that the Strickland flexible standard sufficed because "under the Strickland formulation the
reviewing court may consider directly any adverse effect that the prosecutor's failure to respond might have had on the preparation or presentation of the defendant's case." 10 8 Justice Blackmun reasoned that the
Strickland standard would allow a reviewing court to compensate for
any additional adverse effects in the specific request context by adding
them to the overall detrimental effect of nondisclosure.10 9
Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens each wrote vigorous dis102. Bagley, 105 S.Ct. at 3384 (opinion of Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J.). See also id. at

3385 (opinion of White, J., joined by Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J.).
103. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

104. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3384 (opinion of Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J.); see also id. at
3385 (opinion of White, J., joined by Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J.).
105. Id. at 3384 (opinion of Blackmun, J., joined by O'Connor, J.).
106. Id.

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. Whether or not Blackmun conceived of other adverse effects from specific request nondisclosure is unclear. Blackmun's entire analysis of additional adverse effects in the specific request
context focuses on the defense being misled into believing the evidence did not exist. Bagley, 105 S.
Ct. at 3384 (opinion of Blackmun, J.,
joined by O'Connor, J.). See infra note 150.
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sents.1 10 Justice Stevens, who had written the majority opinion in Agurs,
leveled two attacks. First, he argued that the majority had misread
Agurs.1 1 1 Justice Stevens asserted that the Agurs Court had simply restated the Brady specific request materiality standard and had concerned
itself with determining whether to extend that standard to cover the general/no request situation.' 12 In Justice Stevens's view, the Bagley majority should have simply applied the Brady specific request materiality
13
standard which Agurs and Strickland had left untouched.
Justice Stevens's second attack assailed the weakness of the majority's new materiality standard. 114 He contended that actively misleading
the defense through nondisclosure of specifically requested evidence is as
serious as perjury. 115 In Justice Stevens's view, the standard enunciated
by the majority would inadequately deter such prosecutorial misconduct. 116 The majority's new standard "reduce[d] the significance of deliberate prosecutorial suppression of potentially exculpatory evidence to
that merely of one of numerous factors that 'may' be considered by a
' 11 7
reviewing court.
Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall both argued that the majority's
standard gave the prosecutor too much discretion,1 18 "legitimizing the
nondisclosure of clearly favorable evidence." 119 Justice Marshall maintained that the new materiality standard is so high and noninclusive that,
even in the specific request context, prosecutors are encouraged not to
disclose but instead "to gamble, to play the odds, and to take a chance
that evidence will later turn out not to have been potentially
0
dispositive." 12

III.

THE CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF BAGLEY

All courts addressing the Bagley standard have agreed that Bagley
abandoned the Brady-Agurs materiality framework.1 2 1 However, courts
have disagreed over whether the Bagley standard treats specific requests
110. Id. at 3385 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 3397 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 3399 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 3397-99.
113. Id. at 3399.
114. Id. at 3400.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 3400; id. at 3393 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 3393 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. See, eg., United States v. Srulowitz, 785 F.2d 382, 388 (2d Cir. 1986); Government of
Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 780 F.2d 302, 310 (3d Cir. 1986); Bond v. Procunier, 780 F.2d 461, 464
(4th Cir. 1986).
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differently than general/no requests. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits as well as the United States Court
of Military Appeals have concluded that the Bagley Court intended
favorable treatment for specific requests; the Third and Fifth Circuits,
however, have not actually applied the Bagley analysis by considering
whether the defense suffered any "specific" adverse effects. 122 The
United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits, on the other hand, have concluded that the Bagley court intentionally adopted a standard that treats specific and general/no requests
the same. 123
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has interpreted Bagley as instructing courts to treat specific requests more favorably by considering adverse effects that arise because the undisclosed
evidence was specifically requested. In Government of Virgin Islands v.
Martinez,124 the Third Circuit held that evidence under Bagley, whether
or not specifically requested, is material when a reasonable probability
exists that its disclosure would have altered the trial result. 12 5 The court
emphasized, however, that any adverse effects on the defense's preparation or presentation of its case that arise from the prosecution's nondisclosure had to be considered because adverse effects were "more likely"
in the specific request context. 126 Specifically, the court noted that the
nondisclosure becomes more misleading as the request becomes more
specific.' 27 The court remanded, directing the district court to apply the
new Bagley standard and consider whether the evidence was specifically
requested and whether there were "specific" adverse effects.' 28 One

other decision by the Third Circuit and two decisions by district courts in
the Third Circuit have addressed Bagley's treatment of specific requests;
each decision is consistent with the Martinez holding.' 29
122. See infra notes 124-37 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
124. 780 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1986).
125. Id. at 306-07, 307 n.5, 310.
126. Id. at 307.
127. Id. at 307 n.5 ("ITihe request for any of defendant's oral confessions may have been sufficiently specific to put the prosecution on notice... and to contribute to the misleading effects of
non-disclosure.").
128. Id. at 311.
129. In United States v. Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1263
(1986), a case involving the materiality of undisclosed, specifically requested evidence, the Third
Circuit noted that Bagley abandoned the Brady-Agurs framework, "significantly" changing the materiality standard for specifically requested evidence. Id. at 1226. The court understood Bagley to
stand for the proposition that specifically requested evidence is material if a reasonable probability
exists that its disclosure would have altered the trial result. Although it acknowledged that the
Bagley Court intended the standard to be flexible, id., the court never discussed the manner in which
the standard's flexibility operated. Thus, in holding the evidence not "material" under Bagley, the
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In Lindsey v. King 13 0 the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit also read Bagley as treating specific requests more favorably. Without discussing the majority's treatment of specific requests, the
court concluded that the Justices agreed in Bagley "that reversal for sup-

pression of evidence by the government is most likely where the request
for it was specific."

13 1

However, because it found that the specifically

court simply applied the "reasonable probability" standard without attempting to understand the
relevance of the request's specificity. Id. at 1230.
Each of the two district courts in the Third Circuit that addressed the question of how Bagley
treats specific requests differently from general/no requests interpreted Bagley as the Third Circuit
later did in Martinez In United States v. Alberici, 618 F. Supp. 660 (E.D. Pa. 1985), the district
court struggled with the Bagley decision. The court pointed out that Bagley replaced the old BradyAgurs framework with a new flexible standard which somehow treated specific request more favorably. Id. at 668. The court found the Bagley opinions confusing. Noting that Justice White's concurrence never explicitly endorsed Blackmun's instruction that courts consider "specific" adverse
effects, the Alberici court concluded that the Bagley decision never articulated a precise standard for
specific requests; Bagley "apparently consign[ed] such evaluation to the reviewing court's discretion,
that discretion being limited, of course, by the Bagley standard." Id. at 668.
Seeking guidance from Bagley on how to evaluate the significance of a request's specificity, the
district court attempted to synthesize the four Bagley opinions. The district court recognized that
Justice Blackmun expected courts to consider all adverse effects, including those that arise because
the request was specific. Id. The court then pointed out that Justice White only endorsed "Blackmun's characterization of the standard as a 'flexible' one, and appeared to suggest that any elaboration of the implications of this flexibility should be left to the lower courts to determine in
accordance with the facts before them." Id. at 668-69. Finally, the court recognized that Justice
Marshall thought specific requests deserved greater protection than the flexible standard adopted
and that Justice Stevens argued that the new standard did not adequately remedy the harmful effects
of nondisclosure in response to specific requests. Id. at 669. The district court determined that five
Justices saw the need to address adverse effects from specific requests (Blackmun, O'Connor, Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens) and that five saw the new standards as "sufficiently flexible to accomodate the implications of a specific request" (Blackmun, O'Connor, White, Burger, and Rehnquist).
The court then concluded that it would identify which requests were specific before applying the
reasonable probability standard. Id.
The court, however, never resolved for itself how the flexibility in the standard should operate.
After identifying the specifically requested evidence, the court did not need to analyze rigorously its
materiality, sincethe evidence was unfavorable, of extremely little probative value, or had been
available to the defense at trial. Id. at 672-77.
In Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533 (D.N.J. 1985), the district court described Bagley's
single standard as
semantical... because in order to assure that the standard has sufficient flexibility, certain
factors must be weighed in determining whether there is a "reasonable probability." The
[Bagley] Court noted, for example, that the more specific the request for evidence "putting
the prosecutor on notice of its value," the more reasonable it is for the defense to assume
from the nondisclosure that the evidence does not exist, and to make pretrial and trial
decisions on the basis of this assumption. Thus, Bagley's instruction gives birth to yet
another sliding scale: the more adverse the effect of the prosecution's failure, the more
likely it is that the suppressed evidence will undermine confidence in the outcome.
Id. at 549-50. Although the district court read Bagley in this way, the court failed in its analysis of
the materiality of the evidence at issue to discuss the possibility of adverse effects resulting from the
request's specificity. Id. at 554-58.
130. 769 F.2d 1034, 1041 (5th Cir. 1985).
131. Id.
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requested evidence at issue was material, the Fifth Circuit did not articulate the manner in which the specific request made the finding of materiality more likely. 132
In United States v. Eshalomi,133 the United States Court of Military
Appeals treated Justice Blackmun's instruction to consider "specific" adverse effects as the effective holding of Bagley. The Eshalomi court concluded that the prosecution's nondisclosure of specifically requested
134
evidence misrepresented to the defense that evidence did not exist.
The court emphasized that "Justice Blackmun cautioned that an incomplete response to a defense request for evidence has the effect of misrepresenting that evidence does not exist." 13 5 The court noted that "under
Justice Blackmun's view, a specific request for undisclosed evidence bolsters the defense case, because 'an incomplete response to a specific request not only deprives the defense of certain evidence, but has the effect
of representing to the defense that the evidence does not exist.' "136 In
concluding that the evidence was material, the court determined that the
defense suffered this adverse effect and added it to the overall detrimental
137
effect of the nondisclosure.

In contrast to the Third Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and the Court of
Miltary Appeals, three circuits have interpreted the Bagley standard as

treating specific requests and general/no requests the same. In United
States v. Jackson, 138 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit concluded that Bagley abandoned any distinction between specific and general/no requests.' 39 The Jackson court explained that
although Brady-Agurs required an inquiry into the request's specificity,"4° such inquiry "need no longer concern us ...since under Bagley
of whether
the reasonable probability standard is applicable irrespective
141

a defendant specifically requested exculpatory evidence."'

132. Id. at 1041-43.
133. No. 49,789 (C.M.A., Oct. 14, 1986) (LEXIS, Miltry library, CMA file).
134. Id. (quoting Bagley, 105 S.Ct. at 3384).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 780 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1986).
139. Id. at 1309-10.
140. Id. at 1310.
141. Id. In two other opinions, the Seventh Circuit also concluded that Bagley gave no preferential treatment to specific requests. In United States ex rel. Smith v. Fairman, 769 F.2d 386 (7th Cir.
1985), the court found it unnecessary to determine whether the defense request was specific, not only
because the evidence was clearly material under any standard, but also because "Bagley suggests that
there is now a single standard of materiality." Id. at 392-93. Similarly, in United States v. Balistried, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) the court stated that "the distinction between general and
specific requests drawn in United States Y.Agurs has apparently been overruled [by Bagley]." Id. at
1222 n.36.
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In United States v. Srulowitz, 142 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit's reading of Bagley. In Srulowitz, the court, without additional discussion, explained that
Bagley
dispelled a suggestion lurking in Agurs that the concept of materiality
might differ depending on whether the defendant had made a specific
request for the undisclosed evidence, or a general request for exculpatory evidence, or no request at all.... [T]he Bagley Court ruled that
whether or not any request for exculpatory material had been made,
undisclosed "evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to1 4the
defense, the result
3
of the proceeding would have been different."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has also
apparently concluded that Bagley abandoned the specific/general distinction. In United States v. Ben M. Hogan, Co., 144 the court acknowledged
that a decision regarding a request's specificity had been necessary under
Brady-Agurs because specific requests were reviewed under a separate

standard.1 45 The court concluded that under Bagley, however, one materiality standard applied "irrespective of the specificity of a request for
evidence made by the defense." 146 Although the court did not expressly

reject the interpretation that Bagley treats specific requests favorably
within the single standard, it did imply that a request's specificity was no
longer relevant at all. 147

IV. THE BAGLEY

MATERIALITY STANDARD:
THEORY VERSUS REALITY

In theory, the Bagley materiality standard does treat specific requests more favorably by instructing courts to consider additional adverse effects that arise from nondisclosure following specific requests. To

read this instruction out of Bagley and disregard additional adverse effects is to ignore the theory of that opinion. Yet this is not to say that
142. 785 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1986).
143. Id. at 388 (quoting Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3384).
144. 769 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1985).
145. Id. at 1299.
146. Id.
147. When contrasting the Brady-Agurs standard with the Bagley standard, the court mentioned
that Brady-Agurs required an initial determination of whether the request was specific or general,
Id. The court, applying Bagley, however, did not determine whether the evidence was specifically
requested. Instead, the court proceeded directly to the materiality issue. Id.
In a subsequent Eighth Circuit case, Fryer v. Nix, 775 F.2d 979 (8th Cir. 1985), the court
considered the materiality of undisclosed, unrequested evidence. Since the evidence was clearly not
specifically requested, the court did not need to address the distinction between specific and general/
no requests. Id. Thus, the court's silence on the issue is not helpful in determining the Eighth
Circuit's position.
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application of the Bagley "adverse effects" standard necessarily benefits
the defendant who makes a specific request. The concept of additional
adverse effects is a creation of the Bagley Court. Brady and Agurs never
contemplated these "specific" adverse effects, but instead justified
favorable treatment for specific requests on other grounds. As will be
demonstrated below, logic compels the conclusion that no additional adverse effects arise in the specific request context. Accordingly, the Bagley
standard in practice provides no advantage to the defendant who makes a
specific request.
A.

The Bagley Materiality Standardin Theory: The Advantage
of the Specific Request.

The Bagley materiality standard treats specific and general/no requests the same except to the extent that reviewing courts are instructed
to consider the additional adverse effects from nondisclosure that may
arise in the specific request context. 148 Although Justice Blackmun did
not expressly say so, these additional adverse effects are theoretically distinct from the two principal forms of injury suffered by the defense in all
situations involving nondisclosure of evidence: (1) the denial to the defense of the persuasive force of the evidence itself; and (2) the denial of
the derivative benefits of the evidence. 14 9 According to Justice Blackmun, the additional adverse effects arising from nondisclosure following
a specific request are caused by the nondisclosure's misleading representation that the requested evidence does not exist. 150
A hypothetical loosely based on the Bagley facts illustrates these
three types of adverse effects. Suppose defense counsel specifically requests any evidence that may show that the government induced its only
witness to investigate and help convict the defendant. In response to the
request, the government fails to disclose a contract that guaranteed pay148. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
149. Some courts have required disclosure of inadmissible evidence that would lead to admissible
material evidence. See, eg., United States v. Ahmad, 53 F.R.D. 186, 193 (M.D. Pa. 1971). One
commentator believes that theAhmad approach is in line with the tenor of the Agurs opinion. Comment, Prosecutor'sDuty, supra note 64, at 210-11. Professors Lafave and Israel, however, believe
that Agurs rejected a duty to disclose inadmissible evidence that would lead to admissible material
evidence. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.5, at 759-60 (1985).
150. Bagley, 105 S.Ct. at 3384. Justice Blackmun's opinion instructs courts to consider any
adverse effects. The opinion could thus be read as contemplating "specific" adverse effects other
than the adverse effect of the defense being misled into believing the evidence does not exist. But
since no other "specific" adverse effects appear plausible and since Blackmun's entire rationale is
based on the possibility of the defense being misled, this note will treat "specific" adverse effects as
being exclusively composed of the adverse effects of the defense being misled into believing the evidence does not exist.
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ment to the witness and his partner on the condition that their investigation led to the defendant's conviction. The defendant is convicted.
On review, the court correctly determines that under Bagley it must
consider whether the defense suffered the three kinds of adverse effects
that separately, or in the aggregate, might have had a material effect on
the trial result. The reviewing court finds that the defense suffered the
first adverse effect, inability to present the evidence, in that the defense
could not present the contract as evidence that the witness was biased or
was motivated by a pecuniary interest. The court also finds that the defense suffered the second adverse effect, denial of derivative benefits, in
that the defense could not derive further favorable evidence from the
contract. The reviewing court reasons that without access to the contract, the defense was unable to notice the partner's name on the contract, interview him, and thereby discover that his testimony would
contradict the government's witness. The court further finds that the
defense suffered the third adverse effect in that nondisclosure of the inducement evidence following a specific request misleadingly represented
to the defense that no inducement evidence existed. In finding this third
adverse effect, the court reasons that the defense abandoned its impeachment strategy because of this misleading representation, and therefore
made no attempt to uncover other available evidence of inducement or to
pursue the point on cross-examination. The court reasons further that,
seeing no other alternative but to try for sympathy, the defense resorted
to putting the defendant on the stand, resulting in grave injury to the
defense from a devastating cross-examination.1 5 1
It is through consideration of the third kind of adverse effect-the
misleading representation that the requested evidence does not existthat the Bagley standard theoretically treats specific requests more favorably and preserves an advantage for defendants making specific requests.
Before considering whether in practice, as opposed to in theory, defendants making specific requests can bolster their case by arguing that they
suffered this third type of adverse effect, it is useful to reiterate that the
idea of considering this third kind of effect is a creation of the Bagley
decision.15 2 While Justice Blackmun identifies the presence of "adverse
effects" as the rationale for treating specific requests favorably, the Agurs
Court had justified favorable treatment for specific requests on other
53
grounds.'
151. Conceiving of a hypothetical situation in which the defense could suffer this third form of
adverse effect was difficult. This difficulty helps to illustrate that courts could rarely determine that
the defense suffered additional adverse effects because the request was specific.
152. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 154-62 and accompanying text.
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B. FundamentalShift in Underlying Rationale: From Notice and
Fairnessto Adverse Effects of Nondisclosure.
Under Brady-Agurs, courts only considered presentation and derivative adverse effects.1 54 In fact, neither Brady nor Agurs mention any adverse effects that result exclusively, or more often, in the specific request
context. The presence of such additional adverse effects was not the reason why the Agurs Court provided a lower materiality standard for specific requests. Instead, Agurs endorsed a lower specific request standard
because specific requests give prosecutors notice of precisely what the de1 55
fense desires.
According to the Agurs Court, a specific request simplifies the prosecutor's disclosure duty by giving notice of evidence that the defense lacks
and believes to be valuable.1 56 Without a specific request, the prosecutor
must peruse his files without direction. Thus, in the general/no request
context, Agurs only required disclosure when evidence was "so clearly
supportive of a claim of innocence that it [gave] the prosecution notice of
a duty to produce."15 7 On the other hand, specifically requested evidence, brought to the prosecutor's attention by the defense, need not be
as self-evidently important.1 58 Therefore, a lower materiality standard
was appropriate.
Commentators have suggested additional reasons for the Agurs
holding that greater notice justifies applying a lower materiality standard
in the specific request context. Professors LaFave and Israel believe that
the Agurs decision "reflected the view that [in specific request cases], the
1 59
prosecutor's responsibility for any resulting trial deception is clear."
Professor Babcock agrees, arguing that a prosecutor's nondisclosure in
response to a specific request "has the feel of misdealing." 160 Professor
Babcock notes Justice Marshall's statement in his Agurs dissent that "[i]t
is the presence of deliberate prosecutorial misconduct and a desire to
deter such misconduct, presumably, that leads the Court to recognize a
rule more readily permitting new trials in cases involving a specific defense request for information."1 61 Also implicit in Agurs, Babcock contends, is the belief that if the defense works hard enough to provide
proper notice, disclosure of specifically requested evidence seems less gra154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

For a discussion of these effects, see supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106-07.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 149, § 19.5, at 757.
Babcock, supra note 38, at 1149.
Id. at 1149-50 n.62 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 121 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
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tuitous and thus less of an intrusion on the adversary system. 162
The Bagley majority, however, approached the distinction between
specific and general requests from a new perspective. The majority never
acknowledged that the Agurs Court treated specific requests more favorably because of the greater degree of notice in the specific request context
and perhaps also because of notions of fairness and prosecutorial misdealing. Instead, the Bagley majority articulated a new reason for
favorable treatment of specific requests, adopting the government's argument that the only rationale inferable from Agurs for applying a lower
materiality standard in specific request cases was the additional adverse
effects arising in the specific request context.163 The government had expressly rejected the contention that the Agurs Court intended the degree
of notice to serve as the rationale for applying different materiality

standards. 16
Believing that such additional adverse effects constituted the only
rationale for a separate, more inclusive specific request materiality standard, Justice Blackmun found that rationale inadequate and concluded
that reviewing courts could compensate for these additional adverse effects by simply considering their impact on the trial result.1 65 Thus, the
Court jettisoned the Brady-Agurs two-part test in favor of a single flexible
standard, with Justice Blackmun assuming that lower courts would be
able to use the single flexible standard to account for the additional adverse affects that might arise in the specific request context. The concept
of additional adverse effects peculiar to nondisclosure following a specific
request thus emerged from the Bagley decision.
C. The Bagley Materiality Theory in Practice.
Taken together, the Bagley opinions instruct the lower courts to engage in an inquiry into adverse effects peculiar to nondisclosure following
specific requests for evidence.1 66 These adverse effects supposedly occur
because nondisclosure in the specific request context misleadingly represents to the defense that the requested evidence does not exist. Because
reviewing courts are to consider these adverse effects, a specific request
for undisclosed evidence theoretically bolsters the defense case. A close
examination of these purported adverse effects, however, reveals that
162. Id.
163. Brief for the United States at 21-22, United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1984) (No. 8448).
164. Id. The brief acknowledged that nondisclosure may mislead the defense into believing the
requested evidence does not exist. Id. at 31.
165. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
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they are no more likely to occur after a specific request than after a general request and that, therefore, the defendant armed with a specific request has no advantage in proving materiality over a defendant who
made only a general request. Moreover, a close examination also reveals
that a court's consideration of the adverse effects of a nondisclosure's
misleading representation to the defense that the evidence does not exist
will never help the defense prove materiality. Therefore, Bagley's re-

quired inquiry not only provides no advantage for specific requests over
general requests but also completely fails to advance the defense case in

proving materiality.
As discussed above, Justice Blackmun concluded that a court's consideration of adverse effects arising from a nondisclosure's misleading
representation that evidence does not exist would be more beneficial to
the defense in proving materiality after a specific request than after a

general request. This conclusion is incorrect because it is based on the
faulty assumption that the defense is more likely to expect disclosure after a specific request. This assumption ignores the fact that, unlike the
Brady-Agurs specific request standard, the Bagley materiality standard
gives the defense no reason to believe that a specific request makes disclosure more likely. Under Brady-Agurs, a specific request triggered a lower
16 7
materiality standard and thus a greater prosecutorial disclosure duty.

Thus, the defense under Brady-Agurs could reasonably expect that the
prosecutor was more likely to disclose evidence if it was specifically re167. It is well-settled that the prosecutor only has a constitutional duty to disclose material
evidence. See United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3379 (opinion of Blackmun, J., joined by
O'Connor, J.) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). Prosecutors, therefore, can only be expected to disclose
evidence not seen as material if they play it safe and interpret their legal duty broadly. Such a
response is unlikely. As Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens each argue in their Bagley dissents,
prosecutors will not disclose but gamble that the defense will never realize evidence was suppressed,
or that the evidence will not meet the high materiality standard upon judicial review. Id. at 3393
(Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 3400 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Professor Babcock agrees, and reported the following anecdote by Jon 0. Newman, then United States Attorney for Connecticut
(now a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit), to the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit:
I recently had occasion to discuss [disclosure under Brady] at a PLI Conference in New
York City before a large group of State prosecutors. I put to them this case: You are
prosecuting a bank robbery. You have talked to two or three of the tellers and one or two
of the customers at the time of the robbery. They have all taken a look at your defendant
in a line-up, and they have said, "This is the man." In the course of your investigation you
also have found another customer who was in the bank that day, who viewed the suspect,
and came back and said, "That is not the man."
The question I put to the prosecutors was, do you believe you should disclose to the
defense the name of the witness who, when he viewed the suspect, said "That is not the
man"? In a room of prosecutors not quite as large as this group but almost as large, only
two hands went up.... Yet I was putting to them what I thought was the easiest casethe clearest case for disclosure of exculpatory information!
Discovery in Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481, 500 (1967), quoted in Babcock, supra note 38, at 1167
n.123.
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quested. In contrast, under Bagley, a specific request triggers no lower
materiality standard and thus no greater prosecutorial disclosure duty.168
It would simply be illogical for defense attorneys to have any greater
expectation that the prosecutor will disclose in the specific request context than in the general/no request context. It follows that defense attorneys, having made a specific request, are no more likely to mistakenly
69
assume from the fact of nondisclosure that the evidence does not exist. 1
Justice Blackmun's analysis is faulty in another respect. Justice
Blackmun assumed that a court's consideration of the adverse effects of a
nondisclosure's misleading representation that no evidence exists could
in some cases contribute to a finding of materiality. But this assumption
is unfounded. The prosecutor's nondisclosure following a specific request can only be interpreted by the defense in one of two ways: (1) the
prosecutor did not have the requested evidence, or (2) the prosecutor did
not believe the evidence was material and thus did not disclose. For the
defense rationally to conclude from nondisclosure that the prosecutor did
not have the evidence, and thus be misled, the defense would have to be
thoroughly convinced that the materiality of the requested evidence was
so completely beyond question that no prosecutor would risk nondisclosure.
If one accepts, however, that only such self-evidently material evidence would justify a defendant's claim of being misled, it becomes apparent that this added adverse effect is superfluous. If a reviewing court
decides that the evidence at the time of review is not material, the court
must find that the defense should not have been misled by the nondisclosure. Conversely, if the reviewing court decides that the evidence at the
time of review is material, the defense could indeed have been misled;
this would be of no consequence, however, because the reviewing court
would reverse in any event due to the inherent materiality of the evidence
itself. Thus, because the defense is reasonably misled only when the evi168. Justice Blackmun may have assumed that a specific request does require a greater

prosecutorial disclosure duty. In his opinion, he quotes Agurs: "When the prosecutor receives a
specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable." Bagley,

105 S. Ct. at 3383 (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106). The Agurs Court justified this assertion by
emphasizing that a specific request gives the prosecutor notice. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106; see also
Babcock, supra note 38, at 1148-49. Justice Blackmun at one point acknowledged that "the more
specifically the defense requests certain evidence, thus putting the prosecutor on notice of its value,
the more reasonable it is for the defense to assume from nondisclosure that 1he evidence does not
exist." Bagley, 105 S. Ct. at 3384 (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun thus recognized the Agurs
Court's correlation between better notice and a greater duty to disclose in the specific request context. Under Bagley, there is no lower specific request materiality standard; thus, better notice, in and
of itself, creates no greater duty to disclose.
169. This note assumes that a reviewing court would apply an objective standard; in other
words, a defense attorney must be reasonably misled.
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dence is material, any additional adverse effects to the defense from having been misled will never affect a reviewing court's decision on
materiality.
Justice Blackmun's standard is thus founded on two incorrect conclusions: (1) the conclusion that, in the specific request context, the defense is more likely to suffer adverse effects from being misled, and (2)
the conclusion that the adverse effects from being misled could ever influence a reviewing court's determination of materiality. The reviewing
courts that follow the Bagley rule and thus search for such additional
adverse effects are in effect engaged in a futile enterprise. The practical
effect of the Bagley rule is to eliminate all distinction between specific
and general/no request situations and reduce the inquiry to the consideration of presentation and derivative effects.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Bagley Court replaced the two-tiered Brady-Agurs framework
with a single standard designed to cover both specific and general/no
requests. In so doing, the Court ignored the notice and fairness rationales underlying the more favorable Brady-Agurs specific request standard. Instead, the Court identified another concern as being central:
that the defense suffers additional adverse effects from nondisclosure following a specific request. To address this concern, Justice Blackmun, in
what must be seen as the effective holding on this issue, instructed lower
courts to consider the special adverse effects suffered by the defense in
the specific request context. This additional consideration theoretically
preserves an advantage for defendants making specific requests. Accordingly, some lower courts have required a search for the special adverse
effects arising because the request was specific.
Under the single materiality standard, however, these special adverse effects in fact do not exist. The efforts of lower courts to follow
Bagley's instructions to treat specific requests favorably by considering
such adverse effects will thus always be futile. Although in theory it preserves an advantage for defendants making specific requests, the Bagley
materiality standard will effectively treat specific and general/no requests
in the same manner.
Bagley's effective equal treatment of specific and general/no requests runs counter to the intentions of at least five Justices (Blackmun,
O'Connor, Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan), each of whom indicated
that specific requests should receive favorable treatment. In addition, the
equal treatment of specific and general/no requests represents a reversal
of the Brady-Agurs materiality framework without any consideration by
the Supreme Court of the notice and fairness rationales underlying that
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framework. The initial lower court response to Bagley has been marked
by a good deal of confusion. For these reasons, the Court should reconsider Bagley and decide whether the notice and fairness rationales are
convincing. Unless the Court believes that its own reasoning in Agurs is
without merit, the Court should reinstate the Brady-Agurs materiality
framework. Only by so doing can the Court once again provide an effective advantage for defendants making specific requests for favorable evidence.
Paul . Nofer

